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THE CASE FOR REPEALING THE
CORPORATE ALTERNATIVE
MINIMUM TAX
Terrence R. Charvat*
Michael S. Knoll**

HE corporate alternative minimum tax ("AMT") was enacted in
its current form in

1986 in response to claims that many large and

Tfinancially profitable corporations were paying little or no federal
income tax. The basis for that belief was a 1985 report issued by the
Citizens for Tax Justice.1 That report, which has since been followed by
similar reports? compared the taxes each corporation paid to the income
it reported to its shareholders. The idea is that if a corporation's actual
tax payments are small relative to its financial statement ("book") in
come, then the corporation is avoiding taxes by artificially depressing its
taxable income. The assumption that is implicit in this exercise is that
book income is not as easily manipulated and thus is a more accurate
measure of a firm's true income than is taxable income.3 Recent events
have undermined that assumption. The financial accounting abuses at
Enron, WorldCom, Global Crossing and Qwest showed that book income
can also be heavily manipulated4 and therefore is not necessarily a more
*

Associate Professor, George Mason University School of Law.
Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School and the Wharton School. The
authors would like to thank Reuven Avi-Yonah, John Barry, Elizabeth Chorvat, Chris
Hanna, and Scott Hodge for comments, Alvin Dong for assistance with research, and the
Tax Foundation for its financial support Tiiis article is based in part upon Terrence R
Chorvat & Michael S. Knoll, The Economic and Policy Implications of Repealing the Cor
porate Alternative Minimum Tax, Tax Foundation Background Paper No. 40 (Feb. 2002).
1. R OBERT S . MdNTYRE & D AVID WILHEM, C ORPORATE T AXPAYERS AND CoRPO
RATE F REELOADERS: F OUR YEARS OF CONTINUING, LEGALIZED T AX A VOIDANCE BY
'
AMERICA s LARGEST CoRPORATIONS 1 98 1 - 1 984, at 2 (Citizens for Tax Justice 1985), avail
able at http://www.ctj.org/pdf/corp0885.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2003). Citizens for Tax Jus
tice ( "CTJ") issued a report stating that more than 100 of the Fortune 500 corporations had
not paid any federal income tax in at least one year during the early 1 980s. Many similar
studies had been issued for a number of years. See, e.g., Thomas Edsall, Study Says Some
Firms Paid No U.S. Taxes, W ASH. PosT, Dec. 15, 198 1 , at A7. However, CTJ's 1985 report
received much more attention than had prior reports.
2. E.g., Robert S. Mcintyre & T.D. Coo Nguyen, Corporate Income Taxes in the
1990s (2000).
3. An explicit assumption in the exercise is that each firm's actual tax payments can
be estimated with reasonable certainty. See discussion infra Part IV.
4. For WorldCom, see WorldCom's Collapse, N.Y. T IMES, July 23, 2002, at C6; for
Global Crossing, see Clinton, Other Democrats Named in Global Crossing Fraud Suit.
BLOOMBERG NEws May 7, 2002; for Qwest, see Qwest, Directors Sued Over Stock Sales,
Accounting, BLOOMBERG NEws, Aug. 1 4, 2002.
**
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accurate measure of performance than is taxable income.5 Thus, recent
events demonstrate the falsity of the assumption upon which Congress
justified the corporate AMT. Undercutting the original justification for
the corporate AMT does not by itself make the case for its repeal. It
does, however, justify a re-examination.6
Based on such a re-examination, we argue that the corporate AMT
should be repealed. In this article, we argue that the corporate AMT does
not further any significant policy goal, that it imposes substantial addi
tional compliance costs, and that it raises little and possibly no revenue.
Furthermore, it impedes important tax reforms dealing with corporate
tax shelters by obscuring the amount of tax actually paid by corpora
tions.7 A better way to combat tax shelters would be to reduce tax pref
erences and to require more detailed tax disclosures by corporations.8
Part I of this article examines the history and background of the corpo
rate AMT. Part II examines the arguments made by defenders of the
minimum tax and finds them wanting. Part III discusses the effects of the
corporate AMT on corporations and the economy. It shows that the cor
porate AMT has much to argue against it. Part IV discusses the issues
that will arise if we decide to eliminate the corporate AMT. In particular,
it addresses how we should deal with the current stock of AMT credits,
the issue that derailed the most recent attempt to repeal the corporate
AMT. It also discusses how the principal concern currently being raised
by the minimum tax's defenders-that repeal would unleash a new and
even greater wave of corporate tax shelter activity-could be more effec
tively addressed by reducing tax preferences and requiring greater public
disclosure of public companies' tax information.9
I.

BACKG ROUND AND HISTORY OF THE CO RPO R ATE AMT
A.

BACKGROUND

In 1998, the most recent year for which official data are available, the
5. Gary A. McGill & Edmund Outslay, Did Enron Pay Taxes? Using Accounting In
formation to Decipher Tax Status, 96 T AX NoTEs 1125 (2002); Victor Fleischer. Enron 's
Dirty Little Secret: Waiting for the Other Shoe to Drop, 94 TAx NoTES 1045 (2002) (arguing
that Enron's tax accounting showing roughly zero income was much more accurate than its
financial accounting showing large amounts of income).
6. For earlier proposals to eliminate the corporate AMT, see Hearings Before the
House Comm. on Ways & Means, 102d Cong. (1995) (statement of Mark A. Bloomfield
and Margo Thorning on Behalf of the American Council for Capital Formation). See also
ANDREW LYoN, CRACKING THE CoDE: MAKING SENSE oF THE CoRPORATE ALTERNA
TIVE MINIMUM TAX 129-37 (1997). For a more recent proposal, see STAFF oF J. CoMM. ON
TAX'N, 107TH CONG., STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE OF THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AND
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION, PURSUANT TO SECTION 8Q22(3)(B) OF THE IN
f'ERNAL REVENUE CoDE OF 1986. JC S 3 01 (Comm. Print 2001).
7. McGill & Outslay, supra note 5. See also discussion infra note 50. The corporate
AMT has also confused and obscured the analysis of corporate tax shelters. See McGill &
Outslay, supra note 5.
8. See discussion infra Part IV.
9. See Ronald A. Pearlman. Demystifying Disclosure: First Steps. 55 TAx. L. REv.
289 (2002).
-

-
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Treasury collected $3.3 billion in taxes from the corporate AMT.10 That
figure, however, does not reflect the likely level of current and future
collections for two reasons. First, significant changes to the minimum tax
that were enacted in 1997 had not been fully implemented by 1998.11
These changes are expected to reduce corporate AMT collections
sharply.12 Second, corporations are able to claim a credit against their
regular income tax for AMT payments made in previous years. In some
years, such as 1998, total credits claimed exceeded total collections.13 In
those years, net corporate AMT receipts are negative. Taking these two
factors into account, going forward, net corporate AMT collections are
expected to average about $1 billion per year.14 That is to say, on aver
age, annual corporate AMT collections are expected to exceed credits
taken against the regular corporate tax by roughly $1 billion.
I n comparison, the regular corporate income tax raises about $200 bil
lion annually.15 Thus, the corporate AMT accounts for only about one
half of one percent of total federal corporate income tax collections. Al
though taxes raised by the corporate AMT have been and will continue
to be small, that does not mean its consequences are minimal. That is
because the minimum tax affects a large portion of the corporate sector.
In 1998, 18,360 firms paid the corporate AMT.16 A better and more
useful gauge of the minimum tax's economic impact is to look at the per
centage of total assets held by affected firms. The Department of the
Treasury recently reported that "[o]ver one-quarter of all corporate assets
were held by companies paying higher taxes [in 1998] due to the AMT."17
This latest data is in line with past years. According to a 1995 General
Accounting Office study, during the first five years that the corporate
AMT was in effect (from 1987 through 1991), 49 percent of corporations
10. PATRICE TREUBERT & WILLIAM P. JAUQUET, CoRPORATION INcoME TAx RE
TURNs, 1998, at 66 (2001). available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/98corart.pdf (last vis
ited Feb. 10, 2003).
1 1 . The 1997 changes were fully implemented in 1999.
12. The Joint Committee on Tax estimated that the 1997 changes would reduce corpo
rate AMT collections by more than $2 billion a year. STAFF OF J. CoMM. oN TAx'N. 105TH

Cmw., ES'I1MATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE CONFERENCE AGREEMENT ON THE REVE
NUE PROVISIONS OF H.R. 2014, THE "TAXPAYER RELIEF Acr OF 1997," at 3, J CX-39-97
(1997), reprinted in 76 TAx NoTES 593 (1997).
13. TREUBERT & JAt:OUET, supra note 9, at 73. For 1998, the total AMT credit
claimed was $3.4 billion, while the AMT collected was $3.3 billion. ld. For 1997, $4.1
billion was claimed in credits and $3.9 billion was collected. Jd.
14. /d.
15. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BuDGET, BuDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GovERNMENT:
FISCAL YEAR 2003, HISTORICAL TABLES 29-30 tbl.2.1, 31-32 tb1.2.2; JOHN s. BARRY, THE
CoRPORATE TAX BURDEN: CoRPORATE INCOME TAx CoLLECTIONs RtsE DESPITE
PROLIFERATION OF S CoRPORATIONS; COMPLIANCE BuRDEN RE'\.lAINS HIGH, (Tax Foun
dation, Special Rep. No. 107. 2001) , available at http://www.taxfoundation.org/sr107.pdf

(last visited Feb. 10, 2003).
16. TREUBERT & JAUQUET, supra note 9, at 73.
17. Press Release. Dep't of Treasury, Treasury Releases Data on the Corporate Alter
native Minimum Tax (Nov. 6, 2001 ), available at http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/
po762.htm (last visited Feb. 10. 2003). The Treasury report also noted that the manufactur
ing sector is particularly hard hit by the corporate AMT. "Over one-half of all manufactur
ing assets were held by companies paying higher taxes under the AMT." ld.
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with more than $50 million in assets had their tax payments increased in
at least one year. These corporations accounted for 66.2 percent of all
assets held in corporate form.18
B.

THE

HISTORY oF THE CoRPORATE

AMT

In 1969, Congress adopted a minimum tax for both individuals and cor
porations. The corporate minimum tax, which was known as an "add-on"
minimum tax, was separate from the regular corporate income tax and
was paid in addition to it. The base for this tax was so-called "tax prefer
ences" enjoyed by the taxpayer rather than the taxpayer's income. Se
lected tax preferences in excess of the $30,000 exemption amount were
subject to a 10-percent tax.19 Other than an increase in the tax rate to 15
percent in 1976, this early form of the minimum tax was largely un
changed until the Tax Reform Act of 1986 ("TRA 86").
In 1986, Congress adopted the corporate AMT in its current form. Ac
cording to the Senate Finance Committee's report on TRA 86, the princi
pal objective in enacting the corporate AMT was to ensure that profitable
corporations would not "avoid significant tax liability by using various
exclusions, deductions and credits," to which they are entitled under the
regular tax, but which are not viewed as accurately reflecting economic
income.20 Interestingly, other provisions of TRA 86 itself reduced the
need for a corporate AMT by altering many of the preferences that cor
porations used to reduce their taxable income relative to their book in
come. Chief among these changes was the new tax depreciation rules.
The Accelerated Cost Recovery System ("ACRS"), which existed be
tween 1981 and 1986, greatly accelerated the depreciation deductions that
firms could use on their tax returns as compared with the straight-line
depreciation that they typically reported to their investors.
The new tax depreciation system introduced by TRA 86, which is often
referred to as modified ACRS ("MACRS"), is still faster than straight
line depreciation, but it is significantly slower than the depreciation that
was available under ACRS. Therefore, some of the perceived problem of
financially profitable corporations paying too little tax was solved in 1986
by directly attacking the problem that the corporate AMT addressed only
indirectly.
Because of various problems2I with the corporate AMT, Congress en
acted some significant changes to the tax in 1997. As will be discussed in
18. GEN. AccouNTING OFFICE, EcoNOMIC STATISTics: STATus REPORT oN THE INITI
ATIVE TO IMPROVE EcoNOMIC STATisTics, GAO/GGD-95-98 ( 1 995).
19. See id. at 20. Unlike the current corporate AMT, tax credits were not restricted.
!d.
20. STAFF oF J. CoMM. oN TAx'N, SuMMARY oF H.R. 3838 (T Ax REFORM AcT oF
1986) AS REPORTED BY THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON FINANCE, JCS-1 2-86 ( 1986) (hereinaf
ter SuMMARY OF H.R. 3838].
2 1 . Congress believed that the corporate AMT inhibited capital formation, so it al
tered depreciation schedules to conform more closely with those under the regular tax. See
J. CoMM. ON TAx'N, 105TH CoNG., GENERAL ExPLANATION OF TAx LEGISLATION EN
ACTED N 1997. JCS-23-97 (Comm. Print 1997).

I
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more detail below, Congress altered the depreciation rules under the
AMT in 1997 to bring them more in line with the depreciation rules for
regular taxable income. This significantly reduced AMT collections.
Prior to 1997, corporate AMT collections were approximately $4 billion
per year. The Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that the 1997
changes would reduce AMT payments by approximately $2 billion per
year, essentially cutting collections in half.
c.

T HE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATE AMT AND CALCULATION
OF THE AMT LIABILITY

The corporate AMT operates as a separate corporate income tax paral
lel to the regular corporate income tax. Unlike the earlier add-on mini
mum tax that it replaced, the current corporate AMT requires affected
corporations to calculate their tax liability under two parallel tax systems.
First, a corporation calculates its income tax liability under the regular
corporate income tax; then, it must calculate its tax liability under the
corporate AMT. As the phrase "alternative minimum tax" implies, the
corporation pays the greater of its regular tax liability or its liability under
the AMT. Accordingly, if a corporation's regular tax liability exceeds its
liability under the AMT, it pays its regular tax liability.22 If, however, its
liability under the AMT is greater than its liability under the regular tax,
it must pay its regular tax and make an additional payment of the differ
ence.23 The additional payment is referred to as the corporation's AMT
liability.24
The corporate AMT differs from the regular corporate income tax in
two principal ways. First, the corporate AMT rate of 20 percent is sub
stantially below the regular corporate income tax rate of 35 percent that
applies to most corporations.25 Second, the tax base for the corporate
AMT, alternative minimum taxable income ("AMTI"), is broader than

22. A taxpayer's regular income tax liability after the foreign tax credit but before
other tax credits is referred to as its regular tax liability.
23. For purposes of determining whether a corporation's AMT liability or its regular
tax liability is larger, the regular tax does not include the accumulated earnings tax. the
personal holding company tax, the built-in gains tax, the tax on excess passive income of S
corporations and additional taxes due to an investment credit recapture or low-income
housing recapture.

24. This definition of a corporation's AMT tax liability ensures that the additional
revenue raised by the corporate AMT equals the corporate AMT liability.
25. Compare I.R.C. §55 (2002) (corporate AMT), with I.R.C. § 11 (2002) (regular
corporate tax rate). For large corporations, the regular corporate income tax is 35 percent.
It is progressive at lower income levels and provides for recapture of the benefit of lower
rates at higher incomes as described in the following table:
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the tax base for the regular corporate income tax.Z6
AMTI is calculated by adding certain preferences and adjustments to
regular taxable income. Preferences and adjustments are items a corpo
ration may claim to reduce regular taxable income, but which are disal
lowed under the AMT. The slower depreciation allowed under AMT
rules is the primary adjustment in the expanded AMTI base. In addition,
the AMT imposes restrictions on the use of net operating losses and the
foreign tax credit and requires a so-called "adjustment for adjusted cur
rent earnings."27
The starting point for determining a taxpayer's AMTI is its regular tax
able income. In general, all rules that apply in determining a taxpayer's
regular taxable income apply in determining AMTI as well. To calculate
AMTI, the taxpayer then adds back various "preferences" and adjust
ments. AMTI is then reduced by an exemption amount. The taxpayer's
tentative AMT liability {often called the tentative tax) is determined by
applying the AMT tax rate to the taxpayer's AMTI, less any exemption
amount.
The AMT rules permit deductions for net operating losses ("NOLs")
from prior years. However, the amount of this deduction cannot exceed
90 percent of AMTI before the NOL is taken into account. Almost all
credits against regular corporate tax, such as the research and develop
ment credit, are disallowed against the AMT. The only credit that is al
lowed against AMT is the foreign tax credit, which must be computed
separately for regular and AMT tax purposes.28
Taxable Income
$50,000 or less
$50,000 to $75,000
$75,000 to $1 00,000
$ 100,000 to $335,000
$335,000 to $10,000,000
$10,000 ,000 to $ 1 5,000,000
$ 1 5,000,000 to $ 1 8,333,333
over $1 8,333,333

Tax Rate
15%
25%
34%
39%
34%
35%
38%
35%

The extra 5-percent tax between $335,000 and $ 1 0 million and the extra 3-percent tax be
tween $15 million and $ 1 8.33 million are to "catch up" on the lower rates applied under
$75,000 and under $ 1 0 million. The net effect is that if a corporation's taxable income is
above $335,000 but less than $ 1 0 million, the average tax rate on all income is 34 percent; if
corporate income is above $1 8.33 million, the average tax rate on all income is 35 percent.
26. The corporate AMT provides that tax is assessed on AMTI less an exemption
amount. The maximum exemption amount for corporations is $40,000. It is phased out at
the rate of 25 cents for every dollar of AMTI in excess of $1 50,000. Thus, the exemption
amount is zero for corporations having AMTI of $3 1 0,000 or more. For most corporations.
the exemption amount will be zero, so they are effectively taxed at a 20-percent flat rate.
27. I.R.C. § 56(c)(l) (2002).
28. The foreign tax credit is equal to the foreign income taxes paid, however it is sub
ject to a limit equal to the amount of U.S. income tax owed (before taking the foreign tax
credit into account) multiplied by the foreign source income of the taxpayer divided by the
worldwide income of the taxpayer. This must be calculated separately for AMT purposes
because both the amount of U.S. tax owed and the definition of income are different for
AMT purposes than for regular tax purposes. LR.C. §§ 56, 901 (2002).
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Corporations are allowed a credit against their regular tax liability for
prior years' minimum taxes paid. If a taxpayer starts paying the corpo
rate AMT and never returns to paying the regular tax, then the AMT
liabilities it pays over the years are permanent increases in its tax liability.
Alternatively, if the taxpayer temporarily pays the AMT, but thereafter
pays the regular tax in large enough amounts so that it exhausts its AMT
credits, then the effect of the AMT is t o accelerate the taxpayer's tax
payments, not to permanently increase them. For those corporations that
will eventually utilize all of their AMT credits, the direct cost to the tax
payer (and value to the government) of the corporate AMT is the time
value of money associated with the prepayment of the regular tax. Th e
calculation o f a corporation's AMT liability i s summarized i n Table L
TABLE 1
The computation of AMT liability is as follows:

*

Step 1

Compute taxable income (TI)
the regular tax rules.

Step 2

Add to this amount any net operating loss (NOL)
deduction carried forward from another tax year
claimed in computing TI for the current year.

Step 3

Add or subtract the adjustments other than the
alternative minimum tax NOL (AMT NOL) deduction and adjusted current earnings (ACE) adjustment.

Step 4

Add so-called "preference items."

Step 5

Add or subtract the adjusted current earnings ACE
adjustment.

as

determined under

The result is Pre-adjustment AMTI

Step 6

Subtract the AMT NOL deduction.

The result is AMTI

Step 7

Subtract the exemption amount, if any.

The result is the AMT tax
base

Step 8

Apply to this base the AMT rate•of 20 percent.

The result is Pre-foreign
tax credit tentative minimum tax

Step 9

Subtract from this the AMT foreign tax credit.

The result is the tentative
minimum tax

Step 10

Compare the corporation's regular tax liability with
its tentative minimum tax.*

If a corporation's regular
tax liability is larger than
its tentative minimum tax,
then its AMT liability is
zero. If the tentative minimum tax is larger, its
AMT liability is the
excess of its tentative
minimum tax liability over
its regular tax liability.

For the purpose of this calculation, the regular tax liability is calculated without AMT credits.

The corporate AMT applies to all corporations, other than:
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1) those in their first year of existence (i.e., the tentative minimum tax
of a corporation in its first year of existence is zero), and
2) corporations that are considered small (i.e., if the corporation has
annual gross receipts of $7.5 million or less for all consecutive three-year
periods beginning after 1993 and ending before the tax year in
question).29
The most important "preference" items and other differences between
the regular income tax and the AMT definition of income are the
following:
1. Deprecintion . The largest difference between AMTI and regular tax
able income results from the different depreciation methods under the
two systems.30 Under the AMT, property (other than real property) is
depreciated using the 150-percent declining balance method.31 Under the
regular tax system, taxpayers will generally use the 200-percent (double)
declining balance method.32
2. Net Operating Losses ("NOL''). AMTI is computed using the AMT
NOL deduction rather than the regular tax NOL deduction. The AMT
NOL cannot exceed 90 percent of AMTI before the AMT NOL is taken
into account. Under the regular tax, if a corporation has NOLs from
prior years and profits in the current year, it can reduce its taxable in
come for the current year by any NOLs it has down to zero.33 Thus a
firm with a large stock of NOLs and positive AMTI (before taking ac
count of NOLs) will have to pay minimum tax even if its regular tax lia
bility is zero.
3. Foreign Tax Credits. The AMT foreign tax credit is calculated in
much the same way as the foreign tax credit allowed under the regular
29. Regulated investment companies ("RICs") and real estate investment trusts
("REITs"). which are exempt from the regular tax, are not subject to corporate AMT.
I.R.C. §59(d) (2002). Organizations that operate in these forms have to apportion items
among their shareholders who will include them in their own individual AMT calculations.
The character as preference items is determined at the entity level, which is then passed
through to shareholders. The corporate AMT applies on a consolidated basis and the mini
mum tax liability must be computed on a consolidated basis. Foreign corporations are also
subject to the AMT, but only on their income and deductions that are effectively con
nected with the conduct of a U.S. trade or business.
30. B efore 1999. the AMT used longer depreciable lives than did the regular tax rules.
Beginning in 1999, depreciable lives under the corporate AMT and the regular tax rules
are the same. Conforming the depreciable lives cut AMT tax collections almost in half.
31. LR.C. §56 (2002). Both the regular tax and the minimum tax apply the straight
line method of depreciation to real property. l.R.C. §§ 56, 168(b) (2002).
32. Property with a class life of 10 years or less is depreciated using 200-percent declin
ing balance method; property with a class life of 15 or 20 years is depreciated using !50percent declining balance method. I.R.C. § 168(b) (2002). With both the 150- and 200percent declining balance methods, the taxpayer switches to the straight-line method for
the first tax year for which the straight-line method (using the adjusted basis as of the
beginning of the year) yields a higher allowance. !d. If, however, the taxpayer uses the
straight-line depreciation for regular tax purposes. it also will use that method for AMT
purposes. ld For purposes of both the AMT and the regular tax. real property is depreci
ated on a straight-line basis. !d.
33. See I.R.C. § 56 (2002). The rationale for carrying over NOLs without limitation is
that it allows the corporation to average out taxable income over several years. which is
viewed as more accurately reflecting the company's total taxable income.
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tax, except that the foreign tax credit limit is calculated using AMTI in
stead of taxable income.34 The foreign tax credit limit is equal to the total
U.S. tax (calculated before the foreign tax credit) multiplied by a fraction
of foreign source income in the numerator and total worldwide income in
the denominator. For purposes of determining the foreign tax credit limit
for AMT purposes, worldwide income and foreign source income are cal
culated using AMT rules. Further, U.S. tax is calculated using AMT lia
bility. When calculating the foreign tax credit limit for AMT purposes,
the credit cannot exceed 90 percent of the AMT liability (calculated with
out taking into account the credit and AMT NOLs).

4.

Adjusted Current Earnings ("ACE").

One of the most burdensome

of the differences between the two taxes results from dealing with "ad
j usted current earnings." A corporation's AMTI for any tax year is in
creased by 75 percent of the excess of the corporation's ACE over its
AMTI determined without regard to the ACE adjustment and the AMT
NOL.3s
ACE is determined using the statutory rules for calculating "earnings
and profits." "Earnings and profits" is separate and distinct from either
AMTI or regular taxable income, although it, like AMTI, starts with reg
ular taxable income and then makes various adjustments.36 Specifically,
in calculating "earnings and profits," tax-exempt interest is included; the
last-in, first-out method of accounting cannot be fully used; the install
ment sale method is disallowed; and the 70-percent dividends received
deduction is disallowed.37 The ACE adjustment means that a corporation
must keep at least three sets of books to calculate its taxes (one for regu
lar tax, one for "normal" AMTI, and a third for the ACE adjustments).

5. Completion methods. AMTI is computed using the percentage-of
completion method of accounting for long-term contracts other than
home-construction contracts. This method requires corporations to
"book" income associated with work in progress rather than waiting until
the contract has been completed. fn contrast, the completed contract
method, which is sometimes allowed for regular tax purposes,38 allows
the taxpayer to defer income until a contract is complete rather than hav
ing to include portions in gross income as the work proceeds.

6.

Excess of depletion.

The excess of any percentage depletion deduc

tions over the year-end adjusted AMT basis of the property on which the
deduction is claimed is considered a preference and so must be added
back to AMTI.
34. I.R.C. §§56, 901 (2002).
35. See generally I.R.C. §56 (2002). Likewise, a corporation's AMTI is reduced by 75
percent of the excess of the corporation's pre-adjustment AMTI over its ACE. The reduc
tion cannot exceed the excess of the total positive adjustments for all prior years over the
total negative adjustments for all prior years. ld.
36. It is also separate and distinct from financial reporting or book income.
37. I.R.C. § 56 (2002).
38. I.R.C. § 460(e) allows the completed contract method for Home Construction con
tracts and other contracts that have a duration of less than two years, and result i n less than
$ 10,000,000 in gross receipts to the taxpayer.
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HOW THE CORPORATE AMT HAS FAILED TO LIVE UP
TO ITS B ILLING

Although Congress originally justified the corporate AMT on the sim
ple premise that firms reporting large amounts of book income to share
holders should be required to pay some substantial amount of tax,39 the
current defenders of the minimum tax have developed additional and
more sophisticated arguments. I n this Part, we examine these more re
cent justifications for the minimum tax. The most common arguments
now being advanced in defense of the corporate AMT are that it im
proves the fairness of the tax system; that it discourages investment in tax
preferred assets; that it is necessary to prevent corporations from using
tax shelters to eliminate their income tax liability; and that it discourages
firms from inflating their book income. This Part demonstrates how the
corporate AMT fails to accomplish any of these goals in a systematic
manner.
A.

THE CORPORATE AMT AND ''FAIRNESS"

The most frequently made argument in defense of the corporate AMT
takes the b road form that a minimum tax will make the tax system fairer.
In its simplest form, this fairness argument can be summarized by the
often-cited quotation of Robert S. Mcintyre, the director of Citizens for
Tax Justice, that "[i]t's a scandal when members of the Fortune 500 pay
less in taxes than the people who wipe their floors or type their letters. "40
At some level, Mcintyre's observation has an obvious appeal. The finan
cial statements of many corporations show large cash flows and assets,
including sometimes large amounts of cash on hand. It seems obvious
that these corporations have the resources to pay at least a minimal
amount of tax. There are, however, several problems with this line of
argument.
First, the corporate AMT is a very inefficient way to collect taxes from
corporations.41 Thus, assuming that corporations should pay more in fed
eral income taxes, the corporate AMT is an especially poor way of forc
ing them to do so.42 As we argue in this article, the corporate AMT
imposes high compliance costs, raises little (if any) revenue, and misallo
cates resources.43 Far more effective would be to eliminate the corporate
S uMM ARY OF H.R. 3838, supra note 20.
JEFFREY H. BIRNBAUM & ALAN S. MURRAY, SHOWDOWN AT GtJCCI GULCH:
LAWMAKERS, LOBBYISTS AND THE UNLIKELY TR llJM PH OF TAX REFORM 12 (1987).
41. Some economists advocate replacing the corporate income tax with a value-added
tax ("VAT") on the grounds that the corporate income tax is a particularly inefficient tax.
See HARVEY RoSEN, Pusuc FINANCE 449 (5th ed. 1999).
42. Of course, if the low rate of tax results from corporations literally cheating-that
is, committing fraud by making false statements on their tax returns-it seems unlikely that
additional rules will get them to comply. Since these firms have already demonstrated a
propensity to cheat to reduce their taxable income, it seems unlikely that adding more self
reported rules will change things much.
43. See discussion infra Part III.
39.
40.
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AMT and either raise the corporate tax rate or reduce tax preferences.44
Indeed, either a small increase in tax rates (less than one percent) or a
reduction in tax preferences (such as depreciation) could easily replace
the taxes collected by the corporate AMT while at the same time practi
cally eliminating the full cost of complying with the minimum tax.45
Second, it is important to remember that corporations do not pay taxes,
only people pay taxes. Ultimately, the economic burden of the corporate
income tax, including the AMT, must be borne by individual workers,
customers, and investors.46 While the specific incidence of the corporate
income tax has been a particularly contentious issue,47 the fact remains
that people pay taxes and the fairness of the corporate AMT should be
evaluated based on its consequences for individuals.
Some defenders of the corporate AMT are willing to take up the chal
lenge of justifying the corporate minimum tax based on its incidence by
arguing that it improves vertical equity.48 Their argument is usually cast
as an argument that the corporate AMT increases tax progressivity.49
There is a long-standing and extensive debate over whether the tax sys
tem should be progressive and, if so, how progressive.50 We do not in
tend to join in that debate in this article. What can be said here is that
elimination of the corporate AMT would have little, if any, effect on the
overall progressivity brought about through the corporate income tax.
44. The argument supporting so-called preference items, which are deviations in the
definition of taxable income from economic income, is that there is some well-grounded
policy reason for it. See STEPHEN Urz, TAX PoLicY: AN INTRODUCTION AND SuRVEY OF
THE PRINCIPAL DEBATES 234 (1993). An example would be that the taxpayer is providing
a valuable social service that is not adequately compensated by the market and so the
taxpayer should be compensated by the government. For example, charitable contributions
are deductible, because of a belief that the social benefits of charity are not fully compen
sated. !d. Another example would be income on which it is simply too expensive to collect
tax. For example, de minimis fringe benefits, which are excluded from income under
I R C. § 132, are excluded because it would be too costly to tax them. See WILLIAM KLEIN
ET AL., FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 63-5 (7th ed. 2000). If a corporation is providing
many socially beneficial services, then it is not necessarily a bad thing that it pays little or
no tax. If. on the other hand, there is no external social benefit, Congress could save
considerably more money by drafting the rules more carefully.
45. See discussion infra Part IV.B.l. The federal corporate tax, with its close to flat 35percent tax rate, raises roughly $200 billion a year. See Barry, supra note 14, at 2. Thus, a
1-percent increase-to 36 percent-will raise roughly $6 billion, which is three to six times
larger than estimated gross annual revenue from the minimum tax.
46. MICHAEL L. MARLOW, A PRIMER ON THE CoRPORATE INCOME TAx: INCIDENCE,
EFFICIENCY, AND EouiTY IssuEs (Tax Foundation, B ackground Paper No. 38, 2001).
47. The classic article in this area is Arnold C. Harberger, The Incidence of the Corpo
rate Income Tax, in TAXATION AND WELFARE 135-62 (A. Harberger ed., 1974); see also
Joseph Stiglitz, The Corporate Income Tax, J. Pus. EcoN., Apr./May 1976, at 303-11.
48. MciNTYRE & NvauEN, supra note 2, at 10.
49. A tax system is progressive if the ratio of the tax paid to income tends to increase
with individual income. That is to say, a progressive tax system is one in which the average
tax rate is an increasing function of income. U Tz, supra note 44.
50. See, e.g., Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Why Tax the Rich? Efficiency, Equity, and Pro
gressive Taxation, 111 YALE L.J. 1391 (2002) (book review); Michael Livingston, Blum and
Kalven at 50: Progressive Taxation, "Globalization", and the New Millennium, 4 F LA. TAX
REv. 731 (2000) ; Joseph Bankman & Thomas Griffith, Social Welfare and the Rate Struc
ture: A New Look at Progressive Taxation, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1905 ( 1987); WALTER BL U M &
HARRY KALVEN, THE UNEASY CAsE FoR PROGREssivE TAXATION (1953).
.
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While it is true that the corporate AMT increases taxes more on investors
who invest in corporations that pay little in corporate taxes, there is prob
ably no difference in the wealth of shareholders in firms that are affected
by the AMT and those that are not. It is thus unlikely that the corporate
AMT increases progressivity by raising taxes more on corporations with
wealthier investors than on corporations with less wealthy investors.
Alternatively, the argument that the corporate AMT increases progres
sivity can be framed as the following: the minimum tax increases taxes on
capital, which fall more heavily on the wealthy. This argument has some
merit because higher-income individuals tend to earn a higher portion of
income from capital.51 However, any increase in corporate taxes would
have the same effect. Accordingly, if a general increase in corporate taxes
is desirable, Congress should increase corporate tax collections directly
either by raising tax rates or by cutting back on preferential tax treat
ments, such as accelerated depreciation. As stated above, either change
would raise corporate taxes without incurring the compliance and other
inefficiency costs associated with the corporate AMT.
B.

THE CoRPORATE AMT AND INVESTMENT I N TAX

PREFERRED ASSETS
Another argument that some defenders of the corporate AMT make is
that the minimum tax discourages investment in tax-preferred assets,52
which can increase efficiency by shifting investment to projects with a
higher total return.53 This is an example of the general theory of the
second best-the idea that a policy that would reduce efficiency in an
otherwise distortion-free environment might increase efficiency because
it offsets other distortions. It thus might be true that the corporate AMT
increases efficiency because it reduces the distorting effects of tax prefer
ences. However, if true, it does so in a manner that is far more costly
than simply reducing preferences. If there is too much investment in tax
preferred items, a simpler and more effective policy would be to reduce
tax preferences for all firms. For example, if lawmakers think deprecia
tion is too rapid or depletion allowances too high, they should scale them
back directly. More generally, if the tax system provides too much en
couragement for a particular type of investment, the law should be
changed. Conversely, if the tax system provides the appropriate level of
encouragement, the benefits should not be limited arbitrarily by corpo
rate AMT.
The current compromise-large preferences and a corporate AMT-is
a poor solution. It is the worst of both alternatives. It does not generally
51. See David Shakow & Reed Shuldiner, A Comprehensive Wealth Tax, 53 TAx L.
REV. 499, 559-60 n.143 (2000).
52. As discussed infra Part III, much of the i mpact of the AMT is to change the form
of the investment rather than to prevent it. Of course, to some extent the corporate AMT
does discourage investment in tax-preferred assets.
53. RosEN. supra note 41. at 300-02.
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discourage firms from making tax-favored investments. It only discour
ages those firms that are subject to the AMT from doing so. As described
below, the result frequently will be that the same investments will be
made, but that they will be made by firms that are not as efficient, or they
will be made at a different time, or they will be financed in a different
way.s4
The argument that the corporate AMT is a good policy because it dis
courages excessive investment in tax-preferred assets is sometimes cast
using the language of political economy. Defenders argue that the mini
mum tax is an economically desirable political compromise because it re
strains Congress from providing larger and more distorting preferences.
We have two observations. First, this argument (at least if it stands by
itself) is a concession on the merits. It recognizes that the corporate
AMT is a bad policy and that it should be eliminated if another method
of restraining Congress's largesse can be found. Second, we are skeptical
of such a political argument in this context. The corporate AMT is
among the most complex parts of the corporate tax.55 It seems unlikely
that politics would require a complicated and opaque provision to tax
large and sophisticated parties such as corporations. Relative to individ
ual taxpayers, corporations are likely to have a comparative advantage in
understanding and lobbying to amend a complicated tax provision.
C.

THE CoRPORATE AMT AND CoRPORATIONS' UsE oF
TAX SHELTERS

Another argument that defenders of the corporate AMT frequently
make is that the minimum tax is necessary to restrain corporations' use of
abusive tax shelters. 56 In the last five years or so, the media has focused a
bright light on corporate tax shelters, and some of the transactions
brought to light are highly abusive. 57 There is also a concern that corpo
rations are making widespreal:l use of abusive tax shelters.58 As a result,
the minimum tax's defenders are concerned that its repeal would unleash
54. See discussion infra Part III.
55. See Joel B. Slemrod & Marsha Blumenthal, The Income Tax Compliance Cost of
Big Business, 24 PuB. FrN. Q. 411 (1996).
56. See, e.g., Citizens for Tax Justice, House GOP "Stimulus" Bill Offers 16 Large,
Low-Tax Corporations $7.4 Billion in Instant Tax Rebates (Oct 26, 2001), at http://
www.ctj.org/pdf/amtl6.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2003) (describing the purpose behind re
pealing the corporate AMT to be "to facilitate future tax sheltering")
57. Janet Novack & Laura Saunders, The Hustling of X-Rated Tax Shelters, FoRBE s
Dec. 14, 1998, at 198. Academics have also looked closely at tax shelters. See, e.g., Joseph
Bankman, The New Market in Corporate Tax Shelters, 83 TAX NoTES 1775 (1999); Sympo
sium, Business Purpose, Economic Substance, and Corporate Tax Shelters, 54 SMU L. REv.
3 (2001).
58. See Bankman, supra note 57; Mihir Desai, Tax Dodging: Enron Isn't Alone, Busi
nessWeek Online (Mar. 4, 2002), at http:// www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02_09/
b377 2051.htm ("[Mihir A.J Desai figures that more than half the difference between tax
and book income is generated by shelters, the careful shifting of earnings from one year to
another, and outright fraud.").
,
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an even larger wave of tax shelters. 59
This claim is dubious for several reasons. First, there are legal and non
legal constraints on tax shelter activity.60 Admittedly these constraints
are imperfect, but they do operate. Second, and more to the point, the
corporate AMf does little to constrain tax shelter activity. Many tax
shelters are unlikely to be restrained until the corporate taxpayer has al
ready sheltered much of its income. For example, tax shelters using for
eign tax credits or net operating losses can eliminate 90 percent of AMTI
before the AMf's limits on the use of foreign tax credits or net operating
losses are triggered. Also, many tax shelters rely on tax preferences that
are not directly reduced by the AMT. Instead, because AMT firms have
their incomes increased, the affected firms are required to use larger shel
ters to receive the same amount of tax benefit. The cost of this additional
sheltering activity is probably minimal (because the documents are al
ready drawn up and shelters are often priced as a percentage of the tax
saved). Moreover, it is reasonable to expect tax shelter promoters to de
velop and market shelters that are not defeated by the minimum tax.
Although the corporate AMT does little to aid the government in its
battle against tax shelters, it arguably makes it more difficult for Congress
to address the problem. That is because the claim made by some defend
ers of the corporate AMT-that the minimum tax restrains abusive cor
porate tax shelters61-could also be used by tax shelter promoters to
argue that additional rules are not needed to restrain corporate tax shel
ters.62 In Part IV, we discuss some reforms that have greater potential to
discourage tax sheltering.
D.

THE CoRPORATE AMT AND FINANCIAL AccouNTING

Another argument made by defenders of the corporate AMT is that
the corporate AMT helps to restrain companies from inflating their fi
nancial statements.63 The argument is that because the corporate AMT
more closely tracks book income it discourages aggressive accounting.64
Although it is true that book income generally exceeds regular taxable
income and that AMTI is generally between book and taxable income, it
59. See, e.g., Citizens for Tax Justice, supra note 56; Robert S. Mcintyre, The $212Billion Giveaway, 12 AM. PROSPEcr 20 (2001 ), available at http://www.prospect.org/print/
V12/20/mcintyre-r.html (last visited Feb. 10, 2003) (describes the corporate AMT as "now
discourag[ing] tax sheltering").
60. See Pearlman, supra note 9; see also David M. Schizer, Frictions as a Constraint on
Tax Planning, 101 CoLUM. L. REv. 1 312 (2001).
61. Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Why the Corporate A M T Should be Retained, 93 TAx
NoTES 988 (2001); Mcintyre, supra note 59.
62. McGill and Outslay argue that the AMT also complicates the analysis of the tax
payments of corporations. See McGill & Outslay, supra note 5; see also infra text accompa
nying notes 63-65.
63. G. Ramachandran & A. Srikanth, Corporate Earnings-Restoring Realism and
Sanity, HINDU Bus. LINE (July 25, 2002), available at http://www.blonnet.com/2002/07125/
stories/2002072500030800.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2003).
64. ld. For analysis of how the AMT more closely tracks book income, see RoBERT
MciNTYRE, WHY WE HAvE A CoRPORATE AMT (2001).
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is not clear how the corporate minimum tax restrains companies from
inflating book income. Financial and tax books are separate and largely
independent from one another. Most important, neither regular taxable
income nor AMTI includes book income as part of the tax base.65 There
is, thus, no tax penalty that firms must pay for reporting higher book
income. It follows, therefore, that there is no reason to expect that the
minimum tax discourages firms from inflating reported earnings.
Some commentators go even further. McGill and Outslay suggest that
the minimum tax can make it easier for some firms to inflate their re
ported earnings. They show that Enron worked hard to make it appear
that it was paying more tax than it actually was.66 Why would a company
want to appear as if it was paying more tax than it was? If it was obvious
that Enron was paying little or no U.S. federal income tax, then investors
might have begun to wonder if Enron really had much income.67 Even
though Enron was apparently making no profit, the management of En
ron was able to use the complexities of both the financial accounting rules
and the corporate AMT rules to make it appear that it was paying federal
income tax. Therefore, rather than improving the information available
to outside analysts and shareholders, the AMT obscured the ability of
outsiders to understand Enron's actual financial situation by making En
ron appear more profitable than it was.68
We argue below that a more efficacious tax-based response to aggres
sive accounting is to require more extensive disclosures of tax liabilities.
Increased transparency might discourage both tax sheltering and earnings
inflation.69
III.

COSTS IMPOSED BY THE CORPORATE AMT

A ccording to its defenders, the corporate AMT plays an important
function by restraining corporate tax sheltering and financial accounting
manipulation, yet it has few,· if any, negative consequences because it
raises little revenue. We paint a different picture. In our view, the corpo
rate AMT does not systematically advance any legitimate policies, but it
does have substantial negative consequences across a large segment of
the economy.

In Part I, we showed that the minimum tax's impact is

widespread even though gross collections are small. In Part II, we argued
that the minimum tax does not promote any of its goals. In this Part, we
65. There was a time when the corporate AMT included book income in the tax base.
See Mitchell Engler, Corporate Tax Shelters and Narrowing the Book/Tax "GAAP", 2001
CoLuM. Bus. L. REv. 539 (2001).
66. McGill & Outstay, supra note 5, at 1126-27, 1132.
67. Fleischer, supra note 5.
68. McGill & Outstay, supra note 5, at 1126-27, 1132.
69. Because the tax system measures income in a different manner than the financial
accounting system does, shareholders are better informed if they know the results of both
systems, rather than the results of only the financial accounting rules. To the extent that
both tax and financial statement income are based on similar calculations neither would
operate as a check on the other. See infra Part IV.
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argue that the corporate AMT has large and important negative
consequences.
Corporations that pay the AMT have their depreciation schedules
stretched out, their depletion allowances reduced, and their use of NOLs
and foreign tax credits curtailed. These changes, which increase their tax
bills, are at least partially offset by the AMT credits they receive for the
additional tax they pay. These credits can be used in future years to off
set their regular tax liability. However, because these credits cannot be
used to reduce taxes below what they would be with the corporate AMT,
many companies carry AMT credits on their books for years. Companies
with excess credits have their taxes increased by the AMT and have their
incentives altered by it as do corporations that currently pay the AMT.
This is why the corporate AMT's effects are disproportionate to its
revenue.
Commentators who have studied the corporate AMT have recognized
that it is extremely difficult to trace out the minimum tax's affect on in
vestment incentives. That affect depends among other things, upon the
type of asset, the firm's financial structure, and the firm's past and ex
pected future income tax situations.70 Nonetheless, commentators have
recognized four types of largely negative consequences from the corpo
rate AMT. First, it discourages investment. Second, it misallocates re
sources. Third, it is administratively burdensome. Fourth, it makes for
poor fiscal policy.
A. TH E

CoRPORATE

AMT

DiscouRAGES INVESTMENT

The corporate AMT discourages affected firms from investing in plant,
equipment and other productive activities. There are two reasons for
this. First, and most obviously, the "loopholes" that the corporate AMT
curtails are the same incentives that Congress bestowed to encourage
such investment. The minimum tax's preferences and adj ustments reduce
the value of these incentives, thereby discouraging affected firms from
making such investments.
Second, and less obviously, the reduced corporate AMT tax rate, cou
pled with credits that the corporation can use against its regular tax liabil
ity in the future, reduces the effective marginal tax rates for affected
firms. Such a reduction in a firm's effective marginal tax rate will make
tax-advantaged investments less attractive.71 Thus, not only are AMT
70. See LvoN, supra note 6: James B. Mackie, III, Unfinished Business of the 1 986 Tax
Reform Act. 55 !'iAT'L TAx J. 293, 329 (2002).
7 1 . This is an application of the well-known phenomenon that competition for tax
preferred assets drives up their ret urn and reduces their yield. Such a reduction in yield is
called an implicit tax. Assets that bear large amounts of implicit tax are favored by high
bracket investors because they prefer to pay implicit tax ( at the market determined rate)
over explicit tax (at their own tax rate). See, e.g. , Calvin H . Johnson, Inefficiency Does Not
Drive Out inequity: Market Equilibrium & Tax Shelters, 7 1 TAx NoTEs 377. 382 (1996). In
contrast, low-bracket taxpayers avoid assets that bear large amounts of implicit tax because
they prefer to pay explicit tax (at their own rate) over implicit tax (at the market deter
mined rate).
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firms discouraged from investing in plant and equipment, they are also
discouraged from investing in advertising and research because these ex
penditures can be immediately expensed.72 On the other hand, the re
duction in tax rate experienced by firms subject to the AMT will
encourage them to invest in activities that are not tax advantaged, such
as increasing cash reserves.
As described above, the welfare consequences of discouraging invest
ment in tax-preferred investments are ambiguous.73 The rationale for
providing targeted investment incentives is that they have beneficial ef
fects that go beyond the private return earned by the investor.

If the

existence of so-called positive externalities can justify the special tax ben
efits, then the corporate minimum tax reduces welfare by discouraging
welfare-enhancing investment. Alternatively, if the tax code's investment
incentives cannot be justified, they should not be provided by the tax
code at all. Either way, it makes no sense to provide investment incen
tives through one provision of the tax code (the regular corporate income
tax) and to take them away with another (the corporate AMT).
B.

THE CoRPORATE AMT M ISALLOCATES REsouRcEs

The corporate AMT not only discourages some investments; it also
misallocates resources. That is, it changes who makes specific invest
ments, the legal form these investments take, how they are financed, and
when they occur. These changes are all economically wasteful.
One of the keys to understanding the consequences of the corporate
AMT comes from recognizing that it does not affect all firms.

It only

affects those firms whose tax liability is increased or would be increased
by the corporate AMT.74 The investment incentives of firms that have
not had their tax liabilities affected by the corporate AMT are not
changed. The corporate AMT thus introduces an unlevel playing field
between AMT and regular firms because the tax paid on the same invest
ment varies depending upon whether a firm is paying the regular tax or
the AMT. The impact of this unlevel playing field is that an economically
less efficient firm will sometimes make an investment because the corpo
rate AMT prevented a more efficient firm from doing so. That is
inefficient.
72. Expenditures on advertising and research are tax-advantaged because they pro
duce benefits beyond the current year. but can be deducted immediately.
73. See discussion supra Part II.B.
74. A corporation 's tax liability is increased by the corporate AMT if it pays the tax,
has AMT credits that it cannot currently use because that would drive its AMT l iability
below its regular liability, or is paying the regular tax and has declined to make investments
that would have put it into the corporate AMT. At the margin, such firms are all under the
AMT. The Department of the Treasury recently reported that in 1 998, 30.226 companies
had increased tax l iabilities due to the corporate AMT. Eighteen thousand three hundred
fifty-two companies actually paid the AMT and 1 1,874 companies "had their use of tax
credits l imited by AMT rules." See Dep't of Treasury, supra note 17. There is no data on
how many firms changed their investment plans to avoid falling into the AMT. See id.
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Moreover, it is not surprising that firms in specific industries (such as
manufacturing, mining and public utilities) are more likely to be affected
by the corporate AMT than those in other industries.75 This is because
the AMT decreases the expected value of any deductions taken in years
in which the corporation will generate a loss by reducing the amount of
deductions and restricting the use of NOLs. 'This reduces the incentive to
invest in depreciable property, engage in research and development, or
incur other deductible expenses, including paying the salaries of new
hires. 'This change in investment incentives is not tied in any rational way
to any legitimate governmental purpose (e.g., improving the efficiency of
the economy or the provision of public goods).
'The AMT also influences the form certain investments take. One of
the largest and most important differences between the corporate AMT
and the regular corporate income tax is the treatment of depreciation. 76
For tax purposes, the lessor of leased property is generally considered the
owner and therefore is permitted to depreciate the leased property.77
The lessee cannot depreciate the property, but it can deduct lease pay
ments from its regular taxable income. Because lease expenses are not an
adj ustment or preference item, an AMT firm that leases property does
not suffer the same disadvantage as one that owns property. Moreover,
many of the benefits of accelerated depreciation can be passed through to
the lessee in the form of reduced lease payments.78 Thus, to the extent
that the AMT causes firms to lease instead of own property, the effect is
to impose additional costs of writing leases as well as the agency costs
from separating the user from the residual claimant.
The AMT also discourages firms from using debt relative to equity to
finance capital investments.

Because interest payments are deductible

but dividends and retained earnings are not, a corporation with more
debt in its capital structure will (other things being equal) report smaller
taxable income and pay a smaller. tax liability. This smaller tax liability
makes it more likely that the debt-financed firm will have to pay the mini
mum tax than an otherwise-equivalent equity-financed corporation. Thus,
the corporate AMT encourages firms to use less debt than they otherwise
would.79
The AMT also can influence the timing of investment. Because AMT
firms have higher hurdle rates for investment in depreciable property
75. LYON, supra note 6, at 108.
76. ld. at 1 3 1 .
77. ld.
78. The Department of the Treasury estimated that 84 percent of the benefits went to
the lessees. See Statement of Treasury Secretary Regan, Preliminary Report on Safe-Har
bor Leasing Activity in 1981 (1982), reprinted in 15 TAX NoTEs 85 (1982).
79. This is another example where the corporate AMT counteracts a questionable tax
policy. Here, the questionable policy i s the preferential treatment of debt, which tends to
increase bankruptcies and discourage investments that cannot support much debt. See
Michael S. Knoll, Taxing Prometheus: How the Corporate Interest Deduction Discourages
Innovation and Risk·Taking. 38 VILL L. REv. 1 461 (1993). Once again, a better policy
would be to eliminate the differential treatment of corporate debt and equity directly.
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than other firms, they have a greater incentive to invest before they are
subject to the AMT or after they come out of it.8° This encourages firms
to change the timing of their investments. As described below, this time
shifting is especially undesirable because of the cyclical effects of the cor
porate AMT.
Finally, because AMT liability is calculated on a consolidated basis,
firms that expect to find themselves subject to the AMT have an incen
tive to merge with other firms. If the combined entity would not be sub
ject to the AMT, but one of the two entities individually would, then the
corporations have reduced their joint tax liability through the merger.s 1
This incentive is likely to be stronger in the case of conglomerate mergers
because the incomes of the various businesses are likely to be uncorre
lated. As a result, the constituent firms of a conglomerate can probably
offset one another's tentative AMT liability. The investigation of the
many tax-planning costs associated with mergers and their preparation is
outside the scope of this paper. The important point here is that this cost
and all of the other costs described in this Part arise because of the corpo
rate AMT and not for an economically beneficial reason.
C.

THE CoRPORATE AMT INCREASES TAx CoMPLIANCE CosTS

The corporate AMT complicates the tax system and makes compliance
more costly. According to a 1995 survey of large corporations conducted
by Joel Slemrod and Marsha Blumenthal, the tax compliance costs of
firms subject to the corporate AMT are 18 to 26 percent higher than
those of firms that are not subject to the tax.82 Most of the additional
cost is derived from supplementary planning, record keeping, and form
completion required by the minimum tax. For example, instead of calcu
lating the amount of tax owed once, the corporate AMT requires each
corporation that might potentially have to pay the tax to keep at least
three sets of tax records: one for regular tax purposes, one for 'normal'
AMTI calculations, and a third for the ACE adjustment. Within these
three sets of tax books, each firm must keep as many as five sets of depre
ciation records.s3
The Slemrod and Blumenthal measure of the additional compliance
costs of AMT firms does not precisely measure the cost of complying
with the corporate AMT. There are two principal reasons for this.84
First, firms that are subject to the corporate AMT are likely to have more
supra note 6. at 67-68.
This benefit exists whether the AMT firm eventually uses its credits or not, but the
benefit of a merger is greater if the AMT firm would not have exhausted the credits be
cause then there is a permanent reduction in tax from the merger. Alternatively, if the
AMT firm would have eventually used the credits, then there is only a timing benefit from
the merger.
82. See Slemrod & Blumenthal, supra note 55.
83. See LYON, supra note 6; See also, Slemrod & Blumenthal, supra note 55, at 415.
84. Another reason is that the sample is not representative of firms subject to the
corporate AMT.
80.
81 .

LYON,
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complex tax situations and thus to have more complicated tax returns
than those that are not. The former, for example, are likely to use more
depreciable property in their businesses and to incur the additional cost
of dealing with those rules. Even without a corporate AMT , such firms
would likely have higher tax compliance costs than other firms. That
would suggest that the Slemrod and Blumenthal measure overestimates
the increased cost of complying with the corporate AMT.
Second, many companies that are not currently paying the corporate
AMT still must make the required calculations and maintain the neces
sary records. In the Slemrod and Blumenthal survey, of the 365 respon
dents, 167 were currently subject to the AMT and 1 15 were not. Of the
1 1 5 firms that were not currently subject to the corporate AMT , 101 kept
the necessary records and made the relevant corporate minimum tax cal
culations. That non-AMT firms must keep the records necessary to cal
culate the corporate AMT suggests that Slemrod and Blumenthal's
estimate of the additional compliance costs incurred by AMT firms un
derestimates the total cost of complying with the corporate AMT.
Moreover, the underestimate might be very large. That is because the
AMT -related compliance costs of firms that are not currently paying the
AMT are not simply ignored. Indeed, when the Slemrod and Blumenthal
number is used as an estimate of the cost of complying with the corporate
AMT, then the AMT-related compliance costs of non-AMT firms
reduces the estimated cost. That is because these costs are implicitly be
ing treated as part of the cost of calculating the non-AMT firm's regular
tax liability (and thus reducing the difference) when they are really part
of the cost of complying with the AMT.85
However, given these caveats, if we use the Slemrod and Blumenthal
numbers in connection with estimates of total corporate compliance
costs, we can derive an estimate fpr the total compliance costs for the
corporate AMT. The Tax Foundation estimates that the total annual cost
to U.S. corporations of complying with the federal income tax is $40.3
billion.8 6 Multiplying the Tax Foundation's estimate of the total cost to
U.S. corporations of complying with the federal income tax ($40.3 billion)
and the estimate of the percentage of total corporate tax compliance costs
that are due to the corporate AMT (18 to 26 percent) implies an esti
mated cost for complying with the corporate AMT of between $7.2 bil
lion and $10.4 billionP This admittedly rough estimate of the cost of
85. An example might help to make this clearer. Assume the total tax compliance
costs of a typical AMT firm are 100 and of a typical non-AMT firm are 70. This implies an
estimated cost of complying with the corporate AMT of 30 (100 - 70). If, however, the
AMT-related compliance costs of a typical non-AMT firm are 10, then the total cost of
complying with the AMT is not 30, but 50 (100 + 10 - 60).
86. B arry supra note 1 5 , at 8. The estimate is for 1998.
87. A report by the Joint Committee on Taxation estimated that 16.9 percent of the
total compliance cost of corporations was due to the corporate AMT. STAFF OF 1. CoMM.
ON T AX'N, 106TH CONG., PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO THE MARRIAGE
TAx PENALTY, EDucATION TAx INcENTivEs, THE ALTERNATIVE MINIMl:M TAx, AND Ex,

2003]

CORPORATE ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX

325

complying with the corporate AMT is several times the revenue raised by
the tax.
Indeed, since compliance costs are generally deductible, the net reve
nue raised by the corporate A MT might be very small and possibly nega
tive.

If compliance costs are as low as $6 billion annually and are

deductible at a tax rate as low as the 20-percent statutory corporate AMT
rate, the cost to the government in foregone tax revenue is $ 1 . 2 billion.
That is, the corporate AMT would in fact not raise any revenue, but it
would cause a revenue loss of approximately $200 million dollars a year.88
Moreover, unlike the revenue raised by the corporate AMT, where there
is an offsetting tax credit that will later disgorge much of the revenue
raised, this is a permanent cost. Of course, this calculation is subject to
the caveats described above, and therefore it could be significantly off the
mark.
The Slemrod and Blumenthal survey provides further support for the
claim that costs of complying with the corporate AMT are very high.89
Three hundred and fifteen of the

365

tax officers who responded to the

survey provided a response to the question "what aspect of the current
federal tax code was most responsible for the cost of complying with the
tax system?" The two most frequently mentioned provisions were depre
ciation ( 1 1 8 responses) and the corporate AMT ( 1 1 5 responses).90 The
third most frequently mentioned provision was the uniform capi talization
( " UNICAP " ) rules

(85

responses) and the fourth was compliance with

international or foreign taxes

(44

responses).91

The survey also asked "what features of the Tax Reform Act of

1986

most contributed to complexity?" The answer most often given was the
corporate AMT, which was mentioned by more than half of the respon
dents.92

Specifically, of the 3 1 1 firms responding to the question,

189

mentioned the corporate AMT. The next most common response, with

138

mentions, were the UNICAP rules, which were also introduced by
'

TRA 86.93

Slemrod and Blumenthal also asked respondents to suggest reforms
that would simplify compliance. Of the
question,

75

256

respondents answering this

recommended greater uniformity between federal and state

tax systems and 42 recommended greater uniformity between taxable in
come and financial accounting income.94 However, the current tax provi
sion that drew the most criticism was the corporate AMT.

Sixty-two

respondents singled it out: 38 called for its elimination, 1 1 recommended
TAx PRovisioNs. at 38, JCX-39-99 ( 1 999). When combined with the Tax Founda
$40.3 billion number. that implies an estimated total compliance cost of $6.83 billion.
88. The calculation in the text assumes that the corporate AMT actually will raise $1
billion a year. See supra text accompanying notes 1 1 -1 4.
89. See Slemrod & Blumenthal, supra note 55.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.
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it be simplified, and 13 proposed that the ACE adjustment be elimi
nated.95 In contrast, only 19 surveys mentioned the UNICAP rules and
only

13

surveys mentioned the foreign tax credit.96

Another indication of the high compliance costs associated with the
corporate AMT is the amount of money that corporations spend each
year filling out IRS paperwork. A Tax Foundation report based on IRS
paperwork calculations, found that corporations spend 17.3 million hours
filling out AMT-related tax forms.97 At a very conservative cost of $34.66
per hour, the Tax Foundation report estimated the cost of completing
IRS-mandated AMT-related paperwork to be $600.1 million per year.98
This cost is roughly half of the tax revenue that the corporate AMT is
expected to raise. Moreover, this calculation does not include a very
large portion of the total cost of complying with the corporate AMT in
that it does not include costs related to tax planning, record keeping, and
establishing and maintaining separate accounting systems.
Recent studies of corporate minimum tax regimes in other countries
yield similar results.99 India also imposes a corporate alternative mini
mum tax, and the literature on its effects indicates that, much like the
U.S. tax, it raises little revenue, is very expensive, and severely distorts
investment. 1 00
D.

THE CoRPORATE AMT r s PooR FrscAL Poucy

As a matter of fiscal policy, policy makers frequently desire to reduce
taxes when the economy is in a slump and to increase taxes when the
economy is in danger of overheating. 1 0 1 The idea is that. by putting
money into private hands during an economic downturn, the government
can stimulate spending that will bring the economy out of a recession or
possibly prevent one from occurring. Similarly, by removing money from
the private sector when the economy is in danger of overheating, the gov
ernment can help stave off an inflationary spiral. As economists gener
ally recognize, the problem with using taxes as an instrument of fiscal
policy is that it takes time to enact new tax policies and additional time
for those policies to have their intended economic impact. Because of the
delays in observing a problem, formulating a responsive tax policy, and
95. !d.
96. ld.
97. See Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways & Means, 107th Cong. (2001)
(statement of Scott Moody on behalf of the Tax Foundation), available at http://
waysandmeans.house.govllegacy/oversite/107cong/7-17-0ll107-40final.htm#moody (last vis
ited Feb. 10, 2003). Actually this cost is more than half of the net revenue raised because
the costs themselves are deductible from income. The effect of this deduction is not in
cluded in most revenue estimates and hence the amount of revenue raised is even less.
98. /d.
99. See Mahendra Gujarathi & Samir Barua, Effectiveness of Minimum Tax Legis/a

cion and Its Effect on Corporate Financial Reporting: A Comparative Analysis Between the
United States and India. 36 INT'L 1. Ac<.'T . 435 (2001 ).
100. See id. at 436.
101.

JosEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE EcoNOMics oF THE PuBLIC SECTO R 260 (3d ed. 2000).

2003)

CORPORATE ALTERNA TWE MINIMUM TAX

327

then waiting for that policy to have an impact, many economists are skep

tical of the use of targeted tax policy as an instrument of fiscal policy .1 02
In contrast, many economists view tax polices that automatically de
crease revenues when the economy slows and increase collections as it
grows as tending to stabilize the economy. Thus, flat or progressive taxes
as opposed to head taxes are often viewed as fiscally prudent because
collections decrease during recessions and increase during booms. The
corporate AMT, however, works in exactly the opposite direction. Be
cause more firms are subject to the AMT (and fewer firms are utilizing
their credits) during economic downturns than during periods of growth,
the corporate AMT increases collections during recessions and decreases
them during booms . That reduces the stabilizing effect of the corporate
tax, artificially accentuating natural market cycles and thereby tending to

destabilize the economy . 1 03

As an instrument of fiscal policy, the corporate AMT does more than
take money out of private hands during recessions. It also tends to dis
courage corporations from investing in new plant and equipment.1 04 Cor
porations are pushed into the AMT during recessions because their
incomes fall. Because firms subject to the AMT have higher hurdle rates
for many kinds of investment than firms subject to the regular income
tax, the AMT discourages firms from investing during recessions. 1 05 Be
cause increased investment is one road out of recession, the corporate
AMT has the undesirable effect of making such increased investment and
economic recovery less likely.
ALTERNATIVES TO THE CORPORATE AMT AND

IV.

TRANSITIONAL ISSUES
I n this article, we have argued that the corporate AMT distorts invest
ment; that it raises little, if any, revenue; that it imposes large compliance
costs; and that it does not advance any legitimate policy goals. In short, it
is a bad policy. Therefore, the most logical response is that the corporate
AMT should be repealed. There are, however, two hurdles to repeal of
the tax. The first is determining how the existing stock o f corporate AMT
credits should be treated. The second is determining how the abuses that
defenders of the corporate AMT believe it can discourage should be
addressed.
A.

THE TREATMENT OF ExiSTING STocK OF AMT CREDITS

In the seventeen years since its enactment, there have been many calls
t02. See id. at 553.
103. Although the corporate AMT tends to accentuate market cycles, the magnitude of
this effect is likely small because the corporate AMT raises little revenue. See supra text
accompanying note 1 3.
104. LYON, supra note 6.
105. See discussion supra Part III.B; see also LYON, supra note 6, at 1 18-19.
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for repeal of the corporate AMT. 1 06 Until 2001, none of those calls ever
resulted in legislation that passed either house of Congress. In October
2001, the House of Representatives passed, as part of a broad economic
stimulus package, a provision that would have repealed the corporate
AMT. 1 07 The Senate, however, did not follow suit when it considered its
own version of the stimulus bill. 1 08 Unfortunately, debate over repeal of
the AMT was derailed over the issue of what should be done with the
outstanding stock of AMT credits. This Part looks at alternative ways of
treating the outstanding AMT credits if the minimum tax is repealed.
1.

Cash Out Corporate AMT Credits at Full Value

The solution favored by House Republicans as well as corporations
with unused AMT credits was that those credits should be cashed out at
the time of repeal at full value. According to the Congressional B udget
Office, that would have cost the Treasury $25.4 billion, all in fiscal year
2002.1°9 House Republicans defended their proposal as an important
part of an economic stimulus package needed to restart the economy af
ter the September 1 1 attacks. However, even their allies conceded that
the plan was politically untenable in the face of a barrage of attacks as a
corporate give-away. In addition, even among those who favored tax cuts
as a stimulus, it was never clear why AMT corporations should be the
direct recipients of such a large portion of any stimulus package.
There were, however, other arguments for cashing out the credits. The
minimum tax is intended not to increase corporate tax collections perma
nently, but merely to accelerate them. 'That is why firms are granted
credits for the excess minimum tax they paid. Thus, even with a lump
sum payback, the federal government still had the benefit of a $25.4 bil
lion interest-free loan from AMT companies. Viewed from this perspec
tive, cashing out the credits immediately and at full value is not a
corporate give-away, but merely the return of funds that companies were
forced to loan to the government at zero interest.
2.

Eliminate AMT Credits Without Compensation

At the other end of the spectrum, the federal government can elimi
nate the credits without making any payments. The government can take
the position that the credits should expire with the tax. 'There are several
problems with this solution. It changes past AMT payments from tax
accelerations into permanent tax increases. It would also make some
106. See supra note 1 .
107. Senate Passes Stimulus Bill. 2002 TAx NOTES ToDAY 55-40 (2002).
108. In December 2001 , the President removed repeal of the corporate AMT from the
agenda in an ultimately unsuccessful attempt to get other provisions of the bill through
Congress. ld.
109. The largest benefactors would have been Ford Motor ($2.3 billion), IBM ($1 .4
billion), General Motors ($832 Million), and General Electric ($671 Million). Congres
sional Research Service, Memorandum to the House Wavs and Means Committee.. Octo
ber 16, 2001, reprinted in 2001 TAx NoTES ToDA Y 206-1 9 (200 1 ).
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firms worse off with repeal. Nonetheless, proponents of this position
could argue that these costs are one-time costs and so there would be no
efficiency loss from their elimination. Proponents of that view could also
point out that there are frequently winners and losers from changes in
government tax policy.l10 Nonetheless, such a blatant elimination of the
value of the existing stock of tax credits raises the possibility of future
government retroactive increases. That is widely thought to be a bad
idea.ll l
3.

Continue AMT Credits on Same Terms

For many firms, their credits were likely worth less than their face
value. That is because they could not have used them all immediately.
And for firms that would have never be able to use their credits, they
were worthless. The federal government would have therefore provided
a windfall to many companies by cashing out their credits immediately
and at full value.U2 It is also true that canceling the credits without any
compensation would produce a windfall to the federal government at the
expense of firms with AMT credits.
One possible compromise between the two polar positions would be
for firms with unused AMT credits to continue calculating their AMT
liabilities, but only for the purpose of determining the amount of AMT
credits they can take. If their AMT liability exceeds their regular tax
liability, they cannot use any credits. If their regular tax liability exceeds
their AMT liability, they can use their credits, but only to bring their
liability down to what it would have been with the minimum tax. Such a
compromise eliminates the corporate AMT for the future, but it allows
credits to be retired only as fast as they would have been retired with the
AMT. Furthermore, the high compliance costs of the corporate AMT,
described above, would not be entirely eliminated. They would continue
for firms with AMT credit-s until all the credits have been used up.
4.

Cash Out AMT Credits at Reduced Value

The previous alternative would have maintained the current law's tax
treatment with respect to the outstanding stock of AMT credits, thereby
avoiding windfall gains or losses. It is possible to maintain the value of
outstanding credits at roughly their current value without forcing AMT
firms to go through the trouble and expense of maintaining the necessary
records and calculating their AMTI. Instead, the law could provide one
or more simple formulae for using the credits that in aggregate would be
1 1 0. See DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, WHEN RuLES CHANGE: AN EcoNOMIC AND PoLITICAL
ANALYSIS OF TRANSITION RELIEF AND R ETROACTIVITY (2000) .
1 1 1. !d. at 27-32 (arguing that there is no such thing as a one-time tax because taxpayers
know the government can again impose a one-time tax).
1 1 2. That w indfall was probably not close to the $25.4 b illion price tag because many of
the credits would have been used eventually.
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designed to maintain the credits at their current value. There are several
reasonable alternatives possible.
Congress could choose a set number of years that corresponds to how
the credits were likely to be used (e.g. credits cashed in ratably over
three, five, or ten years) or they could allow the credits to be used up to a
fixed percentage of each corporation's tax liability (e.g., use the credits to
offset up to

10, 25

or

50

percent of corporate income tax) or they could

have cashed out the credits at a given fraction of their face value (e.g.,

40,

or

75

20,

percent) . 1 13 All of these compromises would allow the corpo

rate AMT to be eliminated without providing a windfall to either taxpay
ers (as a group) or the federal government from the existing stock of
credits.
B.

ADDRESSING THE CONCERNS THAT A RE PRESERVING THE
CORPORATE AMT

We have argued in this article that the corporate AMT is bad policy
and should be repealed. We believe that it should be eliminated even if
there are no other changes to the tax law. We recognize, however, that in
the current environment that might be politically infeasible. Accordingly,
in this Part, we briefly discuss two proposals that would do a better job of
raising taxes on corporate income and restraining tax sheltering (and per
haps also discouraging firms from inflating their book income) than does
the minimum tax.

1.

Reduce Tax Preferences

As discussed earlier, some defenders of the corporate AMT argue that
the minimum tax should be preserved because it increases taxes on cor
porations and discourages investment in tax preferred assets . 1 1 4

As

shown earlier, the corporate AMT is a very costly way to raise revenue
(which it might not even do) or to discourage inefficient investment. 1 15 A
simple way to raise taxes on corporations without imposing additional
compliance costs or causing new distortions is to raise tax rates. The

$1

billion that the corporate AMT raises annually (ignoring the deductions
corporations take for the cost of complying with the tax) could be re
placed by a small increase in the tax rate. The federal corporate income
tax, with a top bracket of 35 % , raises roughly $200 billion a year. 1 1 6
Thus, an increase in corporate tax rates of 0.2%, with a top bracket of

35.2 % ,

will increase corporate tax revenues by roughly

$1

billion.

An even better response would be to reduce tax preferences. 1 17 That
1 13. We have made no attempt to estimate actual revenue neutral formulae.
1 14. See supra Part II.
1 15. See supra Part I I I .
1 16. See supra text accompanying note 14.
1 17. I f the tax rules provide too much encourage ment for a particular type of invest
ment, the simplest and most logical way to address the problem is to reduce the tax benefit
directly by amending the law. For example, if Congress believes that the depreciation rules
are too favorable, they should flatten out depreciation or lengthen depreciable Jives. Con-
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would not only raise revenue without increasing compliance costs. It
would also reduce distortions.1 18 This can be illustrated using accelerated
depreciation as an example. The most recent tax expenditure budget esti
mates that accelerated depreciation (depreciation in excess of straight
line) costs the Treasury over

$31.62

billion a year. 1 1 9 To pay for the re

peal of the corporate AMT, Congress could reduce the excess of cur
rently allowable depreciation over straight-line depreciation by about

3%.

This small change would not only fund repeal of the corporate

AMT, but it is generally thought that it would also improve investment
allocation by reducing inefficient investment . 120

2.

Better Disclosure of Tax Information
Currently, public companies are required t o reveal their provisions for

taxes. 1 21 From the information disclosed in public financial statements, it
can be quite difficult to determine the actual amount of taxes paid.122 The
numbers derived from financial statements by Citizens for Tax Justice and
similar groups are to some extent guesswork; this allows corporations to
say those numbers are inaccurate (which even if they are close, are still
not exact). 1 23 Whereas if the corporations themselves report these num
bers, such a response would no longer be possible. If public corporations
were forced to reveal the total amount of U.S. tax paid, and what their
taxable income was, they would very likely in many cases decide to ar
range their affairs so as to pay some substantial tax liability, in order to
avoid a potential public relations disaster.124 Alternatively, if they feel
they have good reasons for the small amount of tax paid, they can pro
vide explanatory notes in their annual reports to explain why their tax
income was so low, and why it was so much lower than their book inversely. if the law provides the appropriate level of encouragement, the benefits should not
be limited arbitrarily as the corporate AMT does.
1 18. Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice and Public Interest: A Study of the Legisla
tive Process as Illustrated by the Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 1 39 U. PA. L. RE v 1 ( 1 990).
1 1 9. J. COMM. ON TAX'N, EsTIMATES OF FEDERAL TAX EXPENDITURES FOR THE FIS
CAL YEARS 2003-2007 (2002).
1 20. See Richard Marovits, On the Economic Efficiency of Using Law to Increase Re
.

search and Development: A Critique of Various Tax, Anti- Trust, Intellectual Property and
Tort Law Rules and Policy Proposals, 39 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 63 (2002); see also Jeff Strnad,
Tax Depreciation and Risk, 52 SMU L. REv. 547 ( 1 999).
1 2 1 . McGill & Outstay. supra note 5.
122. /d. at 1 1 30-31 (describing why the current portion o f the income tax provision is
not equivalent to taxes actually paid in the current year).
1 23 . MciNTYRE & NGUYEN, supra note 2. These numbers are questionable for another
reason. Comparing an estimate of the firm's actual tax payments and its book income for
the year misrepresents its tax burden for two reasons. First, it ignores implicit taxes
reductions in the firm's income from investing in tax-preferred assets (e.g., municipal
bonds) rather than fully taxable assets (e.g., corporate bonds). Second, it ignores deferral
taxes-taxes that the firm will pay in the future on income that is reported today on the
financial statements, but is reported in the future on the firm's tax returns. Because finan
cial statements generally use straight-line depreciation, whereas the tax returns generally
use accelerated depreciation, these temporary differences can be substantial for growing
firms.
124. See Pearlman, supra note 9.
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come. It is quite possible that more transparent tax disclosures would
raise more revenue than the corporate AMT.
Moreover, given the efforts to which the managements of Enron and
WorldCom went to convince shareholders that they were paying substan
tial amounts of tax, this information clearly has some value to sharehold
ers. More comprehensive and understandable tax disclosures might have
given the shareholders of Enron and WorldCom a "heads-up" that some
thing was amiss in the financial statements. Requiring such disclosures
might have prevented the scandals by leading the responsible parties to
believe that they would not have escaped detection long enough to profit.
Of course, care would have to be taken not to require disclosure of
strategically important items such as transfer pricing strategies and other
internal corporate matters.125 But better disclosure of aggregate tax
numbers, such as total U .S. tax paid (rather than simply the reserves for
tax, etc.) and the taxable income of public corporations, would give inves
tors a better idea of what is going on in the corporation. 1 26 Furthermore ,
this information would give policy analysts more information with which
to base their analyses and conclusions.
V.

CONCLUSION

Congress should repeal the corporate AMT. The corporate AMT does
not advance any legitimate purpose-it does not increase efficiency or
improve fairness in any meaningful way nor does it restrain tax sheltering
or aggressive accounting. It raises little, if any, money for the govern
ment-net collections are roughly $1 billion a year going forward, but
these collections are offset by the deductibility of tax compliance and
planning costs. It imposes heavy compliance costs (likely several times its
collections) and i t distorts investment, encouraging firms to cut back or
shift their investments.

McGill & Outslay, supra note 5.
In Corporate Income Taxes In the 1 990s, Mcin tyre and Nguyen argued tha t corpo
ratiOns should also report such information as tax before credits, the effects of carrybacks
and carryforwards, and the d ifferences between book income and income for tax purposes.
See MciNTYRE & NGUYEN supra note 2.
125.

�26.

,

